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POOLING AND UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS LEASES

A. Allen King*
OT so many years ago the oil industry faced utter collapse and
ruin, a situation brought on by operations under legal rules developed in the early days of the industry when knowledge of the physical characteristics of oil and gas and their underground reservoirs was
limited as compared with present day knowledge.1 In the late 192o's
and early 193o's discoveries of great new oil fields that were developed
and operated under the Rule of Capture 2 and the Offset Drilling Rule 8
caused a flood of oil on a market unable to absorb it. This not only had
an adverse effect upon the oil price structure but also the oil and gas
reservoirs were punctured with literally thousands of wells representing
an enormous drilling investment.4 The plight of the industry-and of
the general public-was so grave that emergency measures were called
for and were forthcoming.
The obvious point of attack in the problem was the over-production,
thus the oil states concentrated their efforts toward production curtailment.5 The statutes were ostensibly to prevent waste but in some of
them waste was defined broadly to include production in excess of market demand. Under the statutes, the owners of wells drilled into a reservoir were allowed to produce only a limited amount for a given
period of time and the allowable production was prorated among the
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1
Veasey, "The Law of Oil and Gas," 18 MICH. ,L. REv. 445, 652, 749 (1920),
19 M1cH. L. REv. 161 (1920); " ... the oil industry throws financial conservatism
and business sagacity to the winds and indulges in the primitive instincts of the
chase•.• ," Work, "Conservation's Need of Legal Advice," 52 A. B. A. REP. 566 at
570 (1927); Oliver, "Oil and Gas Law Responsible for Overproduction and Waste,"
55 A. B. A. REP. 712 (1930); Merrill, "Evolution of Oil and Gas Law," 13 Miss.
L. J. 281 (1941).
2
Hardwicke, "The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and
Gas," 13 TEX. L. REv. 390 (1935).
3
Ibid.
4
Marshall and Meyers, "Legal Planning of Petroleum Production," 41 YALE L.
J. 33 (1931); Ford, "Controlling Oil Production," 30 M1cH. L. REv, II70 (1932-);
Thomas, "Changing Trends in Petroleum Economics," 55 A. B. A. REP. 703 (1930);
Oliver, "Oil and Gas Law Responsible for Overproduction and Waste," 55 A. B. A.
REP. 712 (1930); Ely, "The Conservation of Oil," 51 HARV. L. REv. 1209 (1938).
15
For excellent review of the statutes see, Ford, "Controlling Oil Production,"
30 MICH. L. REV. II70 (1932).
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various owners, hence the term "proration." Proration has achieved
considerable success in stemming the tide of unneeded oil and gas, but
it has been subjected to severe criticism as being a measure to conserve
an existing capital structure rather than to conserve oil and gas. 6 Proration has retarded the wide open production that was detrimental to
the reservoir energy .and, furthermore, technologists' have gained considerable knowledge of reservoir characteristics as a result of the retarded production.
With the increase in technical knowledge 1 has come a realization
that far -too many wells have beep_ drilled. A well that will fail to
increase the ultimate recovery from a field-by an amount sufficient to
return the investment, plus the cost of operations and royalties, and
plus a reasonable profit has been called an unnecessary well. 8 A great
~any of the unnecessary wells have been drilled by oper~tors under
the mistaken notion that the more wells the more oil, but many of
them were drilled by owners of small tracts to prevent loss of the oil
and gas by drainage to adjoining tracts. Proration has not solved the
problem. Control of drilling as well as of production is needed if the
real conservation objectives, that is, maximum ultimate· recovery and
equitable apportionment of the recovery between properties, are to be
achieved. 9
Two major devices for eliminating the unnecessary well, namely
pooling ( well spacing) and unitization or unit operation, will be the
subject for discussion in this paper.

I
DEFINITION OF TERMS
#

In recent years two terms have become rather firmly established
in the nomenclature of the oil and gas industry, "pooling'' and "unitization." Both refer to methods of achieving cooperative development,
to a degree, of oil and gas properties, and while to the uninitiated they
6
Marshall and Meyers, "Legal Planning of Petroleum Production," 41 YALE L'.
33 ( l 93 l); Marshall -and Meyers, "Legal Planning of Petroleum Production: Two
Years of Proration," 42 YALE L. J. 702 (1933); 51 YALE L. J. 608 (1942)
'
7
Oliver, "Oil and Gas Law Responsible for Overproduction and Waste," 55 A.
B. A. REP. 712 (1930); Haider, "The Principles of Petroleum Engineering Which,
If Properly Understood and Applied, Should Uphold the Constitutionality of Any
Reasonable State Police Statute Designed to Conserve, Maintain, or Require the Efficient Use of the Reservoir Energy of an Oil Pool to Enlarge Ultimate Recovery,"
Paper delivered before the Section of Mineral Law, Am. B. Assn. (1937).
8 Ely, "Legal Restraints on Drilling and Production," An address delivered before
the Section of Mineral Law, Am. B. Assn. (1937).
~ Ely, "The Conservation of Oil,'~ 51 HARV. L. REv. 1209 (1938).
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PooLING AND UNITIZATION

may seem to be synonymous such is not the case and it is important to
distinguish them carefully. The term "pooling" is used, and will be
so used throughout this paper, to refer to the bringing together of two
or more small or irregularly shaped tracts of land to form a drill site in
connection with a program of uniform well spacing.10 The arrangement
is essentially a species of joint venture whereby the various owners of
the tracts pooled join to drill a well and to share in the benefits to be
expected. It may be a pooling of either the working interests 11 alone,
or both the working interests and royalty interests. In the former, it is
probable that compensatory or offset royalty 12 may have to be paid to
the owners of royalty under the tracts not drilled, hence, the latter is
the preferred form. The drill site formed is sometimes referred to as
a drilling unit; thus, confusion is introduced as statutes requiring pooling are often referred to as "unitization" statutes. This is the case with
the so-called compulsory unitization statute of Louisiana.13
"Unitization" or "unit operation," as distinguished from "pooling,"
represents ·development and operation of an oil pool as a unit. It involves the consolidation or merger of all of the interests in the pool and
designation of one or more of the parties as operator. Here the combining of all of the overlying tracts into a single unit has nothing to
do with establishing a given drill site, but it does facilitate proper
spacing as all surface ~ines are ignored. Obviously, this method of development will permit the location of wells on the structure so as to
secure the most scientific use of the natural reservoir energy in the production of oil and gas by primary recovery methods. Such a project
will also be of aid, and many times will be essential, to secondary recovery projects.
As "primary recovery" and "secondary recovery" are terms that
may be mentioned frequently in any discussion of oil and gas conservation they should be explained. By "primary recovery" is meant the
recovery of oil, gas, or oil and gas by any method ( natural flow or arti10
Moses, "Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Unit Operations of Oil Fields,,,
21 Tmc. L. REv. 748 (1943); Myers, "Spacing, Pooling and Field Wide Unitization," 18 Miss. L. J. 267 (1947).
11
The working interest is the operator's interest in the oil and gas produced,
usually it is ¼ of the production.
12
One of the implied covena~ts in an oil and gas lease is to protect the leased
premises against drainage by off-setting wells. When an operator does not wish to drill
a well off-setting production on neighboring tracts he may satisfy his lessor by payment
of "offset'' or "compensatory'' royalty, which is usually an amount equal to the value
of ¼ of the production from the offending wells.
13
La. Acts (1940) No. 157.

.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

ficial lift) that may be employed to produce them through a single
well bore; the fluid entering the well bore by the action of the natural
reservoir energy or gravity. "Secondary recovery" means the recovery
of oil, gas, or oil and gas by any method ( artificial flow or pumping)
that may be employed to produce them through the joint use of two
or more well bores. This method usually involves the injection of
liquids or gases into the reservoir for the purpose of augmenting the
natural reservoir energy, and generally this is done after the primary
recovery phase has passed.14 It should be apparent that the secondary
recovery method is an expensive undertaking and as the input wells
must be scientifically located on the structure such method is one that
almost necessarily calls for unitization.
The two principal _secondary recovery methods are water flood and
repressuring. No more than a definition of these methods will be attempted as it is not necessary to discuss the technical aspects at this
- time.15 Water flood is said to be the deliberate, controlled injection of
water into an oil producing stratum for the purpose of increasing the
percentage and rate of recovery of oil from the stratum.16 Repressuring
is essentially the same as water flood, the difference being the injection
of gas instead of water into the stratum to maintain the reservoir pressure at its efficient producing level. 11
A third type of secondary recovery is cycling of gas. This proceclure involves the production of gas from a gas reservoir or gas cap·
of an oil reservoir, the extraction of some of its heavier hydrocarbon
content, and the return of the residue or dry gas to the stratum from
which it was produced. This method of production may be primary in
the sense that the hydrocarbons are extracted and saved, but the return
of the residue to the gas reservoir or gas cap to maintain reservoir pressure, places this method in the secondary recovery classification. The
process is increasing in importance in the large gas fields and several
large units have been formed involving gas rights only.18
14

SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OIL IN THE UNITED STATES, Am. Pet. Inst. ( I 942).
Ibid; secondary recovery operations are being conducted in many of the states
at the present time. Many of the states have passed laws relating to the subject, for
example, La. Acts (1940) No. 157, §§ 3 and 4; Dickey, "Some Limitations of
Secondary Oil Recovery," A. P. I. DRILLING AND PRODUCTION PRACTICE 66 (1944);
Scott, "Water Flooding is Essential,'! A.P.I., Division of Production, release April 17,
1947; Brown and Myers, "Some Legal Aspects of Water Flooding," 24 TEX. i. REV.
456 (1946); Pressler, "Legal Problems in Cycling Gas," 24 TEX. L. REV. 19 (1946).
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
"Report of the Committee on Natural Gas," Proc. of Sec. of Mineral Law,
Am. B. Assn. (1943).
15
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II
UNITIZATION OF PUBLIC LANDS AND FOREIGN FIELDS

A very fine "laboratory" for experimentation in unitization is to be
found in the public lands for the simple reason that ownership of the
mineral deposits is vested in a single owner. The general public interest in oil and gas deposits under the public domain led to the controversial temporary petroleum withdrawal order of September 27,
1909 19 whereby oil lands were withheld.from disposal by the government. Until the leasing act of 1920 20 was passed it was the policy,
when lands containing oil and gas were disposed of, to grant a fee
simple title thereby divesting the government of all proprietary interest
in the oil and gas deposits. Under the leasing act, however, the government for the first time asserted a continuing interest in the oil and gas
deposits under the public domain. Such assertion was expressed in the
disposals of the public domain under leases for certain periods and on
express conditions. By an amendment of 1930 21 permittees and lessees
were authorized to unite their interests in a cooperative or unit plan of
development when it was determined and certified by the Secretary
of the Interior that such plan was necessary or advisable in the public
interest. The 1930 amendment expired by its own terms and was replaced by the permanent law of 193r.22 Further amendments have
been made in 1935 23 and 1946.24 The important one was the r935
amendment in which the Secretary of the1 Interior was given the power
to require the development and production of-oil and gas deposits under
such unit or cooperative plan as he may deem necessary or expedient.
This is in contrast to the earlier r930 and 193r amendments which
authorized the secretary to approve a unit or cooperative plan with the
consent of the holders of permits or leases involved. The 1946 amendment provides further for approval of pooling of government acreage
with other fee acreage to comply with well-spacing requirements. 25
19

Haglund, "The Current Federal Oil Policy: A Change in Public Land Policy,"
4 So. CAL. L. REv. 195 (1931); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
35 S.Ct. 309 (1915).
20
Act of February 25, 1920, c. 85, 41 Stat. L. 437 et seq., 30 U.S.C. (1940)
§ 181 et seq.
21
Act of July 3, 1930, 46 Stat. L. 1007, 30 U.S.C. (1940) § 226.
22
Act of March 4, 1931, 46 Stat. L. 1523, 30 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 184 and 226.
23
Act of August 21, 1935, 49 Stat. L. 674, 30 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 185, 221,
223 and 226.
24
Act of August 8, 1946, Pub. L. 696, § 5, U.S.C. Cong. Serv., 79th Cong. 2d
sess., p. 921 (1946).
25
Ibid.
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In compliance with the authority granted by the statutes the Secretary of the Interior has issued regulations pertaining to the prospecting and leasing of public lands for oil and gas. 26 Under the statutes
and regulations, leases granted may be forfeited and cancelled by judicial proceedings for failure to comply with the acts, tlie regulations, or
the terms of the lease. The United States government thus controls
leases of public lands not only by the statutes and regµlations but also
by the contractual relations with its lessees. The conclusion may be
drawn that the United States government has the power and authority,
acting through the Secretary of the Interior, to issue rules and regulations concerning all matters of conservation of the mineral resources
of the public lands. Under this power the secretary is authorized to
approve unitization agreements between the various operators and
lessees of such lands. Many such agreements have been app.r:oved and
the units are in operation.27 It was not until January of this year, however, that regulations and a suggested form of unit agreement was
issued by the secretary. 28 The form of agreement is not mandatory and
a liberal latitude is given the members of the industry in formulating
their agreements.
. For more convincing proof of the advantages to be gained from
unit operation of oil pools, attention should be directed to foreign fields.
The ease with which unit operation is attained in such· fields is to be
ascribed to the concentration of mineral ownership in the government.
Mr. Haglund 29 several years ago reviewed the pertinent laws of the
various oil producing countries of South America, and it is noted that
· under those laws minerals belong to the governments. The governments grant concessions to operators upon prescribed conditions, and
usually the concessions are of such an extent as to cov~r an entire geologic structure. Operation of the structure as a unit would follow as
a matter of course. The gains to be achieved over the operation of pools
under a competitive drilling system are pointed out in an instructive
report by Lindsly and Dahlgren 30 who review the experiences in the
26 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 3d sess., on H. Res. 290 and H. R.
7372 (Petroleum investigation}, p. 423 et seq.
27
Id., p. 426, et seq.
28
12 FED. REG. 528:2 (January 25, 1947).
29
Haglund, "The Current Federal Oil Policy: A Change in Public Land Policy,"
4 So. CAL. L. REv. 195 (1931).
so Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 3d sess., on H. Res. 290 and H.
R. 7372 (Petroleum investigation}, p. 485 et seq.; see also Haglund, "The New Conservation Movement with Respect to Petroleum and Natural Gas," 22 KY. L. J. 543
(1934).
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operation of fields in Iran and Iraq and the Masjid-i-Sulaiman field
in Persia. The economics effected in the foreign fields should be rather
cogent argument for the general adoption of such plans in this country,
but the difficulties to be faced in securing such adoptioI?- are formidable
under the system of private ownership of land and minerals existing
here.

III
-

VoLUNTARY POOLING

Although we concede the difficulty in attaining unitization of privately owned oil and gas deposits, still, much has been accomplished
in regulating the drilling of wells and the elimination to a degree of
the unnecessary well. This has been achieved by a scheme of well spacing. That is to say, by determining the number of acres one well may
drain effioiently and allowing only the one well to be drilled on a plot
containing the determined number of acres.
It is obvious that in order to achieve a satisfactory uniform wellspacing program individual tracts that do not conform in size qr shape
to the predetermined drill site must be combined in whole or in part.
The combining of tracts to form a drill site in a well spacing pattern
has been called "pooling," in the definition given above, to distinguish
such form of joint venture from the joint venture involving an entire
oil pool. Pooling of tracts may be by voluntary arrangement between
the several owners or by compulsion under statute.
Operators in many states for many years have accomplished pooling by voluntary arrangements. Such arrangements have been by
separate pooling agreements, at least in the earlier stages of well spacing where the leases contained no provision for pooling of outside
interests. This method, of course, is contractual and no difficulty is
encountered when all of the parties in interest agree.
Separate tracts may also be pooled by the j oinder of the several
owners in a joint or community lease which by its terms is a pooling
of interests.81 Usually in the case of the community lease the agreement
81

Such a clause may be as follows: "It is agreed and covenanted that each lessor
of land in said unitized block will participate in the royalty herein provided from oil,
gas, or other minerals produced from this land if, and as produced and sold, in the
exact proportion as the individual royalty owner's interest in any tract bears to the
aggregate number of acres still held by lessee, its successors or assigns, under lease in
the unitized block, at the time of production." Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159
S.W. (2d) 472 (1942); Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co., 138 Cal. App. 6, 31 P. (2d) 476
(1934); Thomas v. Ley, 177 Okla. 150, 57 P. (2d) II86 (1936); Tanner v. Olds,
(Cal. App. 1946) 16q P. (2d) 366, noted 25 TEX. L. REV. 315 (1947); Shank,
"Some Legal Problems Presented by the Pooling Provisions of the Modern Oil and
Gas Leases," 23 TEX, L. REv. 150 (1945).
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is express as to tht nature of the interest of the parties in the particular
lands covered by the lease. However, a serious question may arise
where the size or shape of the combined leased tract does not conform
to a spacing pattern and it is desired to cQmbine a portion thereof with
other land to form a drill site. It is preferable to accomplish the desired result with a pooling agreement.
Community interests have been achieved, even in absence of specific
language in the lease, where the several owners of separate tracts join
in a single lease of the combined tracts and it does not appear that the
intention was not to pool the tracts. 32
Neither the community lease proper nor the community lease implied from the fact of joinder in a single lease of separate tracts will
solve the difficulty of conforming tracts to a uniform well-spacing
pattern. There is nothing in either form of lease that authorizes the
lessee to pool all or a portion of the leased premises with other land
to form a drill site and in the absence of such authority such pooling
may not be done voluntarily. 38
The more modern oil and gas leases contain a clause 84 which under82
Lynch v. Davis, 79 W. Va. 437, 92 S.E. 427 (1917); Rymer v. South Penn
Oil Co., 54 W.Va. 530, 46 S.E. 559 (1904); Brazell v. Brown, 169 Okla. 623, 38
P. (2d) 17 {1934); Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipkin, 190 Okla. 396, 124 P. (2d)
418 (1942); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ouart, 18 OKLA. B. J. 614 (1947); Parker
v. Parker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 144 S.W. (2d) 303; French v. George, (Tex. Civ. ·
App. 1942) 159 S.W. (2d) 566; Cf. Lusk v. Green, II4 Okla. 113, 245 P. 636
(1926).
83
Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, IOI S.W. (2d) 543 (1937); Brown v.
Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W. (2d) 43 (1943); Knight v. Chicago Corp., (Tex.
1946) 188 S.W. (2d) 564.
84
"Lessee is hereby granted the right to pool• or unitize this lease or any, part
thereof with any other land, lease, leases, mineral estates or parts thereof for the production of oil, gas, or any other minerals. No unit for the production of oil shall
embrace more than forty (40) acres; provided, however, that if any Federal or State
law, Executive order, rule or regulation shall allocate a producing allowable or acreage
per well, then such units may embrace such acreage as may be prescribed. Lessee shall
file written unit designations in the county in which the premises are located. Drilling
operations and production on any part of the pooled acreage shall be treated as if such
drilling operations were upon or such production was from the land described in this
lease whether the well or wells be located on the land covered by this lease or not.
The entire acreage pooled into a unit shall be treated for all purposes, except the payment of royalties on production from the pooled unit, as if it were included in this
lease. In lieu of the royalties herein provided, lessor shall receive on production from
a unit so pooled only such portion of the royalties stipulated herein as the amount of
his acreage placed in the unit or his royalty interest therein on an acreage basis bears
to the total acreage so pooled in the particular unit involved." From Shank, "Some
Legal Problems Presented by the Pooling Provisions of the Modern Oil and G_as
Lease," 23 True. L. REv. 150 at 156 (1945).
1
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takes to give to the lessee the power to pool at any time for development purposes all or any part of the leased land with adjacent lands.
The clause further stipulates that payment of royalties on production
from the area thus pooled will be to the respective owners in proportion to the acreage ownership therein, and that production from any
part of the pooled acreage will satisfy the rental, drilling, and habendum clauses of all of the leases covering any part of such pooled acreage. Usually the size of the drill site that may be created is limited
but a saving clause is inserted to conform the size of the site to a statutory pattern if one is in force. While this clause is mentioned here in
connection with voluntary pooling it is obvious that such a device will
be very useful in those states having compulsory pooling statutes as it
will obviate tedious and expensive proceedings to compel the pooling.
The validity and scope of the clause has not been subjected to the
test of extensive litigation to date; however, such litigation may be
expected. 35 Professor Walker 86 has suggested the possibility of an attack upon the validity of the clause as a violation of the rule against
perpetuities. There would seem to be some merit in this suggestion
when it is observed that the lessee is given virtually unlimited power
to create new property interests in others at any time in the indefinite
future. The question was presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in the case of Imes v. Globe Oil and Refining Company,81 a case involving a clause very similar to the one under discussion. The court
sustained the validity of the clause against the contention that it violated
the rule against perpetuities by holding that the phrase "at any time"
is limited to a reasonable time after execution of the lease. There is a
suggestion in the case that the lessee in a lease containing the clause
in question is the agent of the lessor and as such is bound to use good
faith in the exercise of the power granted. If this suggestion is followed
to its logical conclusion some interesting and provocative problems may
be raised. Mr. Shank 88 has suggested a number of them, but no settled
answers may be given until they arise in litigation. Certain it is that
the power granted must be exercised within the terms of the authorization. 89
85
Shank, "Some Legal Problems Presented by the Pooling Provisions of the
Modern Oil and Gas Leases," 23 TEx. L. REv. 150 (1945).
86
Walker, "Developments in the Law of Oil and Gas in Texas During the War
Years-A Resume," 25 TEX. L. REv. I (1946).
37
184 Okla. 79, 84 P. (2d) 1106 (1938).
88
"Some Legal Problems Presented by the Pooling Provisions of the Modern Oil
and Gas Leases," 23 TEX. L. REv. 150 (1945).
89
Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W. (2d) 543 (1937).

320

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

The pooling clause inserted in a lease may be highly beneficial to
royalty owners in alleviating the harshness of the ~onapportionment of
royalty rule,4° especially when it is used in conjunction with well-spacing regulations. The case of Mueller v. Sutherland 41 may be taken as
an example of the application of the nonapportionment rule in the absence of the pooling clause. In that case a tract of 200 acres was
leased after which the lessee assigned IOO acres. The landowner then
conveyed in fee a specific 24 acre tract, 12 acres of which was out of
the tract retained by the original lessee and I 2 acres of which was out
of the tract assigned. Both operators then drilled a well on each of the
I 2 acre tracts. The Railroad Commission of Texas had established a
20 acre well spacing pattern for the field for proration purposes as a
result of which the lessees each made up the acreage deficiency by allocating an additional 8 acres to each drill site out of land retained by
the lessor. The lessor then contended that he was entitled to %0 of
the ¼ royalty from each of the wells. The court denied the claim on
the authority of Japhet 'V. McRae. 42 The-following language-from the
majority opinion on rehearing is significant:
" . • • The contention is that as a result of the application of
those rules an involuntary pooling of the royalty oil between appellants and the owners of the twenty-four acres subject to the
lease has been accomplished." 48
.
"If there be any unequal production of oil as far a.s appellants
are concerned, it results from their voluntary contract in the ·basic
lease and their failure to guard against same in their conveyance
. of the twenty-four acres." 44
It may be observed that the rather harsh result of the decision might
have been avoided by use of a pooling provision in the lease. However,
there was a sharp dissent by Justice Sutton, the substance of which was
that the case is distinguishable from the J aphet case on the facts and
further that that case antedated the spacing and proration statutes; the
royalty owners under the two eight-acre tracts were utterly powerless
to protect themselves by drilling, thus justice and equity should re-'0 Japhet v. McRae, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 276 S.W. 669; Stephenson v. Glass,
II5 Tex. 192, 279 S.W. 260 (1926); Kimbley v. Luckey, 72 Okla. 217, 179 P. 928
(1919); Galt v. Metscher, 103 Okla. 271, 229 P. 522 (1924).
41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 179 S.W. (2d) 801.
42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 276 S.W. 669.
48 {Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 179 S.W. (2d) 801 at 807.
44
Id. at 808.
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quire a division to prevent wrongful taking.45 It would seem that
Justice Sutton presented the better-reasoned opinion.
The discussion of voluntary pooling of interests should not be
closed without some mention of the necessary parties to such an arrangement. One situation only will be noted, that is the case of the
non-participating royalty interest.46 Questions as to powers of agents,
capacity of parties, that is, infants, guardians, administrators, and the
like are outside the scope of this paper; they are similar to the questions ·
arising in connection with other conveyances. It should be observed,
however, that in the absence of amendatory legislation in those states
having statutes permitting guardians to execute oil and gas leases that
may extend beyond the period of guardianship there may be some
question as to whether such statutory authority is broad enough to permit the pooling of the ward's interest. The non:-participating royalty
interest usually will present no difficulty where pooling is to be accomplished by a separate contract after the leasing has been completed.
But where the pooling is to be accomplished by a clause inserted in the
lease it is an easy matter to overlook the non-participating inter.l;!Sts,
the result of which will be that such interests may not be pooled. 47 In
Brown v. Smith,4 8 the Texas court held that the person having the
leasing power over the non-participating royalty has no right or authority to pool that royalty with royalties from other land.

IV
CoMPULSORY PooLING

Enlightened self-interest and a desire to effect economies in operations led many operators in early days to adopt voluntary well-spacing
programs.49 But always present in the oil industry were the uncooperative operators who, motivated by greed, could and did upset such
voluntary schemes. This inevitably led to promulgation of statutory
programs. In any program of well spacing, statutory or otherwise, the
415

Id. at 806.
The term "non-participating royalty interest'' is used to distinguish mineral
interest, or ownership of the minerals, and royalty interest or bare right to receive
royalty from production under existing or future leases. The royalty interest does not
participate in the leasing, hence, the term "non-participating."
41
Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W, (2d) 43 (1943).
48
141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W. (2d) 43 (1943).
49
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 3d sess., on H. Res. 290 and H. R.
7372 (Petroleum investigation), p. 351, et seq.
46
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problem of the small tract was a co~plicating factor. 50 The earliest
well-spacing regulation was Rule 3 7 of the Railroad Commission of
Texas,61 establishing ten-acre spacing on a statewide basis, but providing for exceptions. When the East Texas Field was developed, with
its numerous small tracts, by far the majority of the wells were drilled
under an exception to the rule.6 2 The general practice of granting exceptions to the spacing rule to permit the owner of the small tract to
· protect his interests resulted in a virtual abrogation of the rule. Because
of the "interdependent and related manner" in which they must conduct their operations, there is no opportunity for self-adjustment by
producers interested in the same pool by curtailing their production to
prevent oversupply. "In the main, as one does, all in the same pool
must do." 58
It may well be asked why the small tracts are not pooled, if it is
admitted that uniform well spacing is a desirable thing and pooling a
means of accomplishing it. The answer lies in the individual natures
of the oil entrepreneurs.
Thus it appears that if uniform well spacing is to be achieved reliance upon voluntary pooling must be displaced by statutory compulsion. It should be remarked, however, that in Texas where pooling is
not compelled there are many :fields in which voluntary pooling has
been achieved.
Credit for originating the idea of compulsory pooling as a condition
of well spacing is given to the draftsman of the ordinance of the City
of Oxford, Kansas,6 4 .challenged in the case of Marrs v. City of Oxford.55 The pertinent provisions of the ordinance are: (I) No well
could be drilled in specified parts of the city without a permit;
(2) only one permit would be issued for each block; (3) holders of
major portions of a block had preferential right to a permit; (4) any
lessee deprived of a permit, or a lot owner whose lot had not been
50
Walker, "Problem of the Small Tract Under Spacing Regulations," 57 Tmc.
~ar AsSN. 157 (1938)
51
Rule promulgated in 1919. See Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1937) Art 6029
for statutory rule making powers of Railroad Commission.
52
Walker, "Problem of the Small Tract Under Spacing Regulation," 57 Tmc.
BAR AssN. 157 (1938).
,
58
VEASEY, CoMPULSORY PooLJNG OF ADJACENT TRACTS INTO DRILLING UNITS
TO CONFORM To AN ESTABLISHED· WELL-SPACING PLAN 3 (1938), originally an
address delivered before Section of Mineral Law, Am. B. Assn., published in pamphlet
form.
54
Id. 21, note 46.
55
(C.C.A. 8th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 134, cert. den., 280 U.S. 573, 50 S.Ct. 29
(1929); noted 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 104 (1929).

PooLING AND UNITIZATION

leased, could participate in the production from a well drilled on the
block by contributing a proportionate share to the cost of the well;
(5) royalty was to be distributed to the owners in the block in proportion to the footage owned by them/ 6 The ordinance was sustained in
the Marrs 51 case as a proper exercise of the police power concerning
public safety, but more importantly, as an adjustment of correlative
rights. 58 In 1930, Oklahoma City acted to restrict town lot drilling
by an ordinance similar in its provisions to the Oxford ordinance.59 This
ordinance was upheld on the authority of the Marrs case.60
The Marrs case is a landmark case in the field of oil and gas law
for by sustaining the 'principle of compulsory pooling of interests the
court opened the way for state statutes in this field. The Oklahoma
law,61 the most detailed of the pooling statutes, was enacted in 1935.
By this act the Corporation Commission is authorized to establish spacing units of uniform size and shape to prevent waste; no unit exceeding
IO acres in size may be established unless 80 per cent of the operators
in number and acreage in the pool consent; no spacing unit may be
established if to establish it will unreasonably a:lfect or impair the
correlative rights of operators or royalty owners in the pool; the size
and shape of the drilling unit is to be determined upon a hearing before
the commission and certain matters material to the determination are
enumerated; provision is made for drilling upon a unit containing
separately owned tracts by one or more of the owners and for participation in the production by the other owners upon payment of a proportionate share of the estimated cost; where a separately owned tract in
a .drilling unit is drilled by the owner thereof, and no other owners
participate, the allowable production from the well is reduced on an
acreage basis, royalty interests under separately owned tracts in a drill56 The ordinance is quoted in full in Marrs v. City of Oxford, (C.C.A. 8th,
1929) 32 F. (2d) 134.
57
Note 55, supra.
58
Marrs v. City of Oxford, (C.C.A. 8th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 134; see Headnote
3, and discussion relating thereto in opinion of court.
59
Summarized by VEAS:sY, CoMPULSORY PooLING OF ADJACENT TRACTS INTO
DRILLING UNITS TO CoNFORM TO AN EsTABLISHED WELL-SPACING PLAN 23 (1938).
60
Gant v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 86, 6 P. (2d) 1065 (1931), affd., 289
U.S. 98, 53 S. Ct. 530 (1933); Robinson, "The Law Applicable to and the Problems
Arising Incident to the Establishment of Oil and Gas Well Drilling Units," 17 OKLA.
B. J. 1928 (1946).
61
Okla. Laws (1935) p. 232; 52 Okla. Stat. (1941) § 81 et seq.; Okla.
Laws (1945) p. 157; Robinson, "The Law Applicable to and the Problems Arising
Incident to the Establishment of Oil and Gas Well Drilling Units," 17 OKLA. B. J.
1928 (1946). •

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

ing unit share in proportion to their acreage holdings. This statute was
subjected to an attack upon constitutional grounds but it was sustained
as an adjustment of correlative rights. 62
The above act was amended in 1945 68 to empower the commission
to establish units containing more than IO acres. This could be done
only if lessees of 66% per cent of the acreage covered by leases of
record consent, and, once a larger unit is established, the same percentage of lesses must consent to a reduction. However, once a pattern is
set, the commission may increase the size of the unit without the consent of the lessees, subject to a limit of 40 acr~ for oil wells producing
from above 8000 feet, I 60 acres for oil wells producing from below
8000 feet, and 640 acres for gas wells.
The Louisiana law 64 empowers the Commissioner of Conservation
to establish drilling units for each pool, except where a pool has been
developed to an extent that establishing a spacing pattern for the pool
would be impractical. A drilling unit is defined as the maximum area
which may efficiently be drained by one well, and such area is to be
considered as sufficiently developed so long as the well drilled thereon
is capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities. Owners of two ·
or more tracts in an established drilling unit may voluntarily pool
.their interests, but if they fail to agree, the commissioner may require
them to do so if this is found by him to be necessary for the prevention
of waste. The act further provides that if the enforced pooling provision is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the owner
of a separate tract within a drilling unit may drill thereon but the
allowable production ffom the well will be reduced on an acreage
basis. 65
The compulsory pooling provision of the Louisiana act was sustained by the Louisiana court in Hunter Co. v. McHugh. 66 In this case
the court was much impressed by the Patterson case,67 particularly the
ez Patterson v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 72 P. (2d) 83 (1938),
appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 376, 59 S. Ct. 259 (1939); see also Croxton v. State, 186
Okla. 249, 97 P. (2d) 11 (1939).
.
es Okla. Laws (1945) p. 157.
64
La. Acts (1940)-No. 157, §§ 8 and 9·
85 The laws of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina contain
pooling provisions similar in form and substance to those in the Louisiana Act. See
Ala. Laws (1945) p. 9, § 13A; Ark. Acts (1939) No. 105, §§ 14 and 15; Fla. Laws
(1945) vol. I, pp. 664-666; Ga. Laws (1945) p. 376; N. C. Laws (1945) c. 702,
§§ _12 and 13.
es 202 La. 97, II S. (2d) 495 (1942).
111 Note 68, supra.
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per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction.68
In New Mexico 69 the statute provides for permissive pooling, but
the enforcement agency may require pooling where an owner of a tract
smaller than the proration unit would otherwise be deprived of an opportunity to recover his just share of the recoverable oil and gas in the
pool. The owner of a small tract is not denied the right to drill on his
tract if it can be done without waste, but the allowable production is
reduced on an acreage basis. Michigan has a similar statute. 70
The statutes briefly summarized here illustrate how the problem
of the small tract in relation to a uniform well-spacing program has
been solved. In each of the statutes the protection of the small tract
owner against confiscation of his oil and gas rights seems ample and
a balance is achieved between his .rights and the policy of the state to
prevent waste. The spacing of wells has gained a considerable hold
upon the industry as a means of eliminating the unnecessary well, but
it has not been entirely successful, as pointed out above, in view of the
great number of wells drilled under exceptions to a spacing rule.
V
OBSTACLES TO

V'OLUNTARY

UNITIZATION

A second method of drilling control to eliminate the unecessary
well is field-wide unitization. If the thesis of the technologists is adopted; that is, if this method of control is the most scientific of all, the
inquiry now should be directed toward the factors preventing its general adoption and problems to be met in carrying out a unitization
project. The inquiry will be limited to lands privately owned, as unitization of public and foreign lands has been discussed above.
Paralleling the well-spacing scheme, unitization of an oil and gas
pool may be accomplished either by a voluntary arrangement or under
statutory compulsion. Failure of general adoption of voluntary agreements to unitize has led to agitation, even at an early date,71 for statutes of a similar nature to the compulsory pooling statutes. Admittedly
the voluntary arrangement is to be preferred as more in line with
our general policy of a minimum of governmental intervention in
68

305 U.S. 376, 59 S.Ct. 259 (1939).
N. M. Laws (1935) c. 72, § 12.
70
Mich. Pub. Acts (1939) No. 61.
71
German, "Compulsory Unit Operation of Oil Pools," 17 A. B. A. J. 393
(1931); Veasey, "The Struggle of the American Petroleum Industry for Economic
Equality," PRoc. OF NEW MEXICO STATE BAR AssN. 98 (1930).
119
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private affairs. Generally, however, three or four obstacles of rather
serious proportions are in th~ way of acceptance of voluntary unit
agreements. These are, (I) fear of prosecution under federal and
state anti-trust laws, ( 2) multiplicity of interests in oil and gas proper!ies, (3) rugged individualism of the oil operators, and (4) suggestion
that unit associations may be taxable as corporations.
Oil operators have advanced as a reason ( motivating or not) for
not entering into voluntary agreements for unitization of an oil pool
the fear of prosecution under anti-trust laws. It is true that unitization
is a form of cooperative activity, but if its primary and real objectives
are the prevention of-waste and protection of the correlative rights in
the pool rather than the controlling of prices and restricting of competition, it does not seem that such activity is proscribed by the antitrust laws.72 In order to encourage rather than compel unit operation
some states, notably Texas, 78 Arkansas, 74 Mississippi,75 Alabama,76
Florida,77 Georgia,78 North Carolina,79 and Oklahoma,8° have enacted
statutes exempting such activity from their anti-trust laws. In the
absence of such statutes it is to be expected that operators may still be
lpathe to enter into unit agreements, for even if the activities and discussions be limited to the legitimate purpose of conservation the fear
of expensive litigation is present.
The problem of the Sherman Act 81 as a deterrent to unit operation
of oil pools was recognized as early as 1927 by a Committee of Nine
appointed by the Federal Oil Conservation Board to study the situation.82 The opinion of the committee was that the act did not apply to
72 American Column and Lumber Co.

v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S.Ct.
II4 (1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 43 S.Ct.
607 (1923); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377
(1927).
78 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1937) Art. 6008, § 21.
74
Ark. Acts (1939) No. 105, § 150.
75 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 6172.
76 Ala. Laws (1945) p. 10, § 13E.
77
Fla. Laws (1945) vol. 1, p. 664, et seq.
78 Ga. Laws (1945) p. 378.
79 N. C. Laws (1945) c. 702, § 13C.
80
Okla. Laws (1945) p. 170.
81 Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. L. 209. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators
Comm., Civil Action No. 2209, now pending in the District Court for the United
States for the Northern District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division, is a case that is
attracting wide attention in the oil and gas industry because of its possible effect upon
unit operations.
82
Myers, "Relation of the Federal Antitrust Laws to the Problem of Mineral
Conservation," 55 A. B. A. REP. 672 (1930).
'
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the arrangements for cooperative exploitation of individual oil pools,
but it was agreed that fear of violation of the law deterred operators
from entering into such plans. It was agreed that permissive legislation
would be necessary before such arrangements could be entered into
with security.88
So far no legislative action along these lines has been obtained and
since each agreement to unitize must rest upon its own particular set
of facts, no ready answer can be given to a refusal to enter into a unit
agreement on the ground of fear of prosecution.
A second obstacle to voluntary unitization is the multiplicity of
interest in oil properties. This problem is very large indeed when it
is considered that successful operation of a plan must have unanimous
approval of the owners in the pool. The tremendous burden placed
upon proponents of a unitization plan may be illustrated by the personal
experience of the writer in connection with the Winkler Field in West
Texas. That field was developed before control of speculative ventures
was inaugurated, as a consequence of which the mineral interests were
bought up by speculators and peddled in very small fractions to hun-:
dreds of investors scattered over the forty-eight states and some foreign
countries. In the case of several leases within the field the common
denominator of the fractional interests in the one-eighth royalty was
expressed in nine digits. While the field is an old one and no unit plans
have been proposed for the present producing horizons it is known that
a plan for unitization of deeper production has been proposed. With
the great number of interested parties and their wide geographical distribution it is apparent at once that the mechanics of securing execution
of a unit agreement will be exceedingly burdensome. Furthermore,
the investor in royalty interest, particularly in the very small interest,
will be difficult to convince that his interest will be better served by a
reduction in the prospect of immediate return, though small, for a
greater overall return which may be indefinitely postponed.
The problem of the royalty owner as a dissenter to a plan is not
as great, however, as the problem of a recalcitrant operator. This is
most effectively illustrated by a quotation from a report by Miller and
Shea.
" ... To be effective, unitization must have mo per cent participation of all interests; otherwise those who do partake start out
under a handicap that seldom can be overcome.
"Recent events show that the 'unit' plan of operation of the
83

Ibid. And see pp. 678 and 682.
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Kettleman Hills (North Dome) Field, California, which went
into effect in 1931, with part of the field not unitized, in the practical sense has not been successful in several respects. It is the
opinion of R. E. Collom, vice-president, Continental Oil Company, and C. P. Watson, vice-president, Seaboard Oil Corporation,
as expressed publicly in 1936,8 that the North Dome of Kettleman Hills is being developed competitively and wastefully in spite
of the efforts of the Kettleman North Dome Association. Less
than 5 per cent of the participating acreage of Kettleman Hills.has
set the pace for development and has dictated the internal allocation of oil production." 85
4,

The authors of the report then go on to point out the effects upon
the oil structure resulting from the failure to achieve complete unitization. They do state that even without mo per cent participation some
benefits have accrued that would not have been realized by wide-open
competitive development, but in the main, success of a cooperative
venture will depend upon full cooperation. This is very difficult to
achieve and the probabilities of success in a given venture are slight.
This calls ,up the third barrier to voluntary unitization-indeed it
is very much tied in with the preceding one-the rugged individualism
of the American oil man. In his statement before the so-called Cole
Committee, Mr. Ben E. Lindsly quoted statements by many of the
'. leaders of the industry expressing approval of unitization.86 When
asked by Congressman Wolverton why, if the plan was so well received, it was not generally_ put into effect, Mr. Lindsly made this
statement:
"I would think just the American spirit of wanting to do what
they want to do and get their money, if they can, and make their
profits, and have the fun of making it in a period of I year rather
than ro, is probably the best answer to your question." 87
8 4.

[Note by Miller and Shea] "Collom, R. E., and Watson, C. P., 'Review of
Developments at Kettleman Hills,' Am. Min. and Met. Eng., Petroleum Development
and Technology, 1937, pp. 195-213."
85
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 3d sess., on H. Res. z90 and H.
R. 737z (Petroleum investigation), p. 397.
86
Id. 475, et seq.; Mr. Lindsly quoted D. R. Knowlton, consulting Petroleum
Engineer, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to the effect that " • . • the oil business
was too busy making money'' to give any thought to unitization, but that the few who
did consider the plan of unit operation "became staunch supporters" of it. Ibid. See
also, Veasey, "The Struggle of the American Petroleum Industry for Economic Equality," PRoc. OF NEW MEXICO STATE BAR AssN. 98 at 1zz (1930).
87
Hearings, ibid.
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, While time has changed the conditions in the oil industry and the
operators have awakened to the need of conservation and cooperation
the rugged individual is still in the picture and he cannot in all cases
be called the "chiseler." There is, among the small independent operators, a feeling of considerable distrust of the large integrated companies
-a feeling that has some justification. This is summed up best by Mr.
Winston P. Henry:
"Practically every major pool is either largely owned by the
major integrated companies before the time of discovery, or later
by the purchasing of lease properties in those fields. For example,
the great East Texas field was discovered by independent operators, but is now in the hands of major integrated companies
through purchases. The same condition is true of Conroe. But
other great fields, like Hastings, Friendswood, and Anahuac on
the Gulf Coast of Texas, and La Fitte and Villa Platte in the Gulf
Coast of Louisiana were discovered and largely dominated from
inception by major oil companies.
" . . • In nearly every case then, it is a fair presumption that
unitized operations would be placed in the hands of major integrated companies, not only because of their domination of the
larger fields, but because of their organizations and capital with
which the development of a large unit could be accomplished.
Independent operators would, therefore, be called on to accept
minor interests. Direct control of their property would be taken
away from them. They would, therefore, have no say as to how
their properties would be developed, or to whom their oil w.ould
be sold, or any control over the costs of development and operations. It is a further fair assumption that the integrated company
placed in control of a given pool would desire to control the supply
of oil from this field for its own pipe lines and refineries, and
therefore, would fix the price which is paid for the oil." 88
The only solution to the problem of the rugged individual is continued effort to "sell" that individual on the merits of a plan.
A fourth obstacle to a voluntary plan of unitization is the fear that
by agreeing to the unit the operators form an "association" taxable as
,a corporation under the federal income tax law•. The term "corporation" in the code includes associations 89 and the associations which are
taxable are defined in the regulations,9° but no single test may be applied uniformly and inflexibly in every case. The Supreme Court of
88

Id., p. 1786.
Internal Revenue Code, § 3797 (a)(3).
90
Treas. Reg. I II, § 29.3797-2.
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the United States in the-case of Morissey Trustees v. Commissioner 91
listed :five salient features of a corporation which features, if present
in an unincorporated association, are sufficient to render the association
taxable as a corporation. The features are (I) title to the property held
by the entity, ( 2) centralized management, (3) continuity uninterrupted by death among the beneficial owners, ( 4) transfer of interest
without affecting the continuity of the enterprise, and ( 5) limitation of
the personal liability of the participants. The avoidance of corporate
tax liability can be achieved by the manner in which the contract is
drawn. It is more likely that the unitization of an oil pool will be
considered by the taxing authorities as a species of joint venture.92

VI
UNITIZATION CONTRACTS

The most widely used methods of accomplishing voluntary unitization of an oil and gas :field is by special contract. Such an agreement
is made necessary by the fact that the leases involved have no provisions authorizing the lessees to contribute the lands covered to the
unit venture. The pooling clause, adverted to above, usually is not
broad enough to permit unitization.98
One not familiar with the procedure for promoting a unit project
would find it difficult to understand the tremendous amount of work
involved. The mechanics of obtaining signatures of all of the interests
to a contract has already been mentioned, but prior thereto, an intensive study must be made by engineers and geologists to determine
the feasibility of a plan and the extent of the unit area. After the study
of the' technologists has progressed to a point where the project may be
formulated the land men and lawyers must devote much time and
effort to the problem of drafting the contract. The drafting problem
is not as simple as the preceding statement may imply for usually a
contract evolves only after long and tedious conferences between the
operators, their engineers and lawyers, and, not infrequently, with
representatives of the royalty interests. After the formal contract has
been drawn the "sales" work begins; there will usually be some skeptical persons who must be cajoled and persuaded as to the benefits to
be derived from the plan.
Every unit plan will necessarily vary with the particular circum91
2

296 U.S. 344, 56 S. Ct. 289 (1935).
SERV. 1f 3508 et seq. (1947). -

v P.-H. FED. Tax.
98
Note 34, supra.

POOLING AND UNITIZATION

33 1

stances, so that no exact form of contract may be stated; but, with that
caveat, the important provisions of a typical unitization contract,94 will
be briefly summarized.
r. The purpose of the contract is stated. Usually this is to unitize
a certain field to prevent waste and to recover the maximum of oil or
gas; or both; to erect a recycling plant, if necessary, to return gas to
the gas producing formation.
2. Terms are defined. This is a most important provision. Among
the terms that should b~ defined with particularity is that of "unitized
substances," which may include gas, with its contituents, or oil and gas,
or oil and casinghead gas only. In any event great care in stating the
meaning of terms will save needless controversy and possible litigation.
3. The method of unitization is stated. This may take the form
of cross-assignments of interests or merly a contractual statement of
the parties' interests in the unitized substances. The method of allocation of the unit products .to the various tracts in the unit should be
stated.fully; this will usually be one of the most difficult phases of the
agreement. In earlier attempts at cooperative operation of leases it was
supposed that each acre in the area was equally productive, thus allocation was on an acreage basis. This method is still used to a large extent
as it has the appearance of fairness and equality to the ordinary man
and is therefore easier to "sell." However, most engineers will agree
that there are differences in productivity between the various tracts
in a pool and even between different portions of a single tract. There
are many instances of a dry hole being drilled just a "location" away
from a "gusher." To take into account these differences in productive
capacity some units today are negotiated on the basis of allocation according to the acre feet of productive sand beneath the several tracts.
Of course, in the early stages of development of an area, the weakness
of this method lies in the lack of data upon which the distribution must
be made. A means of avoiding difficulty in this respect is to provide
for preliminary distribution on an acreage basis with conversion to the
sand factor method when development has progressed far enough to
furnish engineering data. Provision should be made for adjustment of
all interests if this method is followed. Another method represents a
compromise, and that is to distribute a specified percentage of the production, for example, 50 per cent, on an acreage basis, with the remain94

The summary of a unitization contract given here is drawn largely from Myers,
"Spacing, Pooling, and Field-Wide Unitization," 18 Miss. L. J. 267 (1947), with
some alterations and suggestions for additional clauses drawn from the experience of
the writer.
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ing production to be distributed on the basis of acre feet of productive
sand. This method also, has the advantage of providing "sales" features
for owners of some of the obviously poorer tracts in the field. Whatever method is employed it is obvious that in this part of the unit
contract the closest cooperation between engineer and lawyer is required.
4. Provision is made for purchase by the unit management of
existing wells. This provision is made necessary by the circumstance
that unitization of a field is se1dom accomplished until after some exploitation has been done, which will provide necessary data for determination of field limits, productivity, etc. The existing wells, however,
should be placed under the control of the unit so that they may be
operated in accordance with the plan.
5• .If a recycling plant is contemplated, provision should be made
for determination of its necessity and for sharing the cost of construction
and operation.
.
6. If only one substance is unitized, leaving the development of
the leases for all other substances in the original operators, provision
should be made for sale to individual operators of wells drilled by the
unit which produce only non-unitized substances, and for purchase
from such operators of wells drilled by them which produce only the
unitized substance. If the unitized substance is gas and its liquid.
products, provision may be made for purchase of the casinghead gas
produced from oil wells without purchase of the wells.
7. Provision must be made for perpetuation of the leases covering
the unit area by production of the unitized substance at any point in
the unit area. This provision should be so drawn as to make it clear that
the agreement supersedes the provision of the individual leases pertaining to the payment of royalties, rentals, production from the leases,
and the return of residue gas, if recycling is involved, to the producing
horizon.
8. The unit organization is set out, prescribing the powers and
duties of the management. This may be in the form of a committee
and unit operator or some other designated body of representatives.
Usually the govermng body of a unit project is a committee composed of representatives of each of the lessees contributing to the unit.
In this committee· is lodged the general supervisory powers concerning
operation of the project. Sometimes, in very large units, a committee
for royalty interests is provided, but if so, it will act in advisory capacity only. The royalty owner's committee will, of course, have consider-
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able influence in reaching decisions that directly affect the royalty, for
example, enlarging or decreasing the unit area.
The unit operator, usually one of the contributing lessees, is designated and his or its powers prescribed. The unit operator usually is
given considerable latitude in the operation of the unit, including the
right to make expenditures and to charge the lessee members for their
shares. This latter power may have a ceiling placed on the amount of
a single item of expenditure without prior approval of the committee.
A detailed "Accounting Procedure" is attached as an exhibit and incorporated in the body of the agreement by reference. These are
important provisions and care in drafting them will save possible controversy and litigation.
9. Provision should be made for disposal and sale of the unitized
substances. This is particularly important if the substance is oil, for
many of the lessees j,oining the unit may have commitments to refineries which they may have to fill out of the unit production. One type of
arrangement is to allow the Unit Operator to dispose of the production
subject to the option in th½ other lessees to take their share of the production in kind upon furnishing the necessary tankage and connections.
It is usual, also, that payment for the unit production. sold is made
direct to the unit members in proportion to their interest with responsibility fastened on them for payment of the royalty interests. The unit
operator is given a lien on the members' shares to secure reimbursement
of costs and expenses advanced.
IO. The responsibility for the payment of various taxes and the
charge thereof to the members should be prescribed.
I I. Royalty owners should be free from liability for development
or operating expenses.
I2. Provision should be made for the examination of titles to the
tracts to be included and for the rejection of any tract the title to which
is not found to be good.
r3. The contract should be made subject to any and all conservation laws whether then in force or later enacted.
r4. The matter· of the extent of the participating area should be
given careful attention as usually the field has not been developed
fully at the time the contract is made effective. The area may be further extended as conditions may· later warrant, and the conditions and
procedure for admitting additional area should be drawn with meticulous care.
I 5. A usual statement in a contract covering a collective develop-
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ment venture 1s one that negates a partnership relationship of ~he
parties.
I 6. Provision should be made for execution of the agreement in
counterparts as in the usual case the great number of parties would
render circulation of a single copy impracticable.
I 7. The percentage of interested parties necessary to render the
plan effective and place it in operation may be set out. This percentage
usually is set high and the hope is that after the requisite number have
signed and the plan goes into effect the minority interests will come in.
It is very difficult in most large unit projects to obtain the signatures of all of the royalty owners. The problem presented by the
non-assenter is a grave one and usually, in case the hold-out is the
owner of a substantial interest the plan is defeated. Where the interest
, is small, however, the lessee holding the tract or tracts involved may
go ahead and, if a well is drilled on such tracts, agree to pay excess
royalty to the owner of the interest. The fact that there are nonassenters may determine, to an extent, the location of unit wells, that
1s, the unit management may decide not to drill on any tract in the unit
where there are non-unitized interests, thus the owner of such interest
will receive no royalty. This may expose the lessee of such a tract to
an action for breach of the implied covenants to develop and to protect
against drainage, or the lease as to the outstanding interest may expire
for non-development. The lessee may be forced to pay compensatory
royalty or buy out the interest, probably, in the latter case, at an exorbitant price. In trading out the unit contract the lessees may agree
to protect each other from such a situation, and a provision may be
inserted in the contract to that effect.
One other matter deserves some attention in voluntary unitization
plans-the practice in some fields of selling out so called term-royalty
interests.95 Usually these are non-participating royalty interests with
the leasing privilege vested in the owner of the mineral interest. As
has been noted in the case of pooling, the one holding the leasing right
is not authorized to consolidate the royalty interest with others. Thus
the owner of an unexpired t~rm-royalty will be a necessary party to
a unit agreement. The question is what is the effect of the unitization
upon the term-royalty in the event ~o well is drilled upon the tract
95

The designation "term royalty" is applied to that species of royalty interest
that is sold for a definite term of years and "as long thereafter as oil, gas or any other
mineral is produced from said land, or operations· for any such mineral are being conducted thereon, by granter or grantee, or their respective heirs, lessees, successors or
assigns." GLAsSMIRE, OIL AND G4s LEASES AND ROYALTIES, 2d. ed., 411 (1938).

POOLING AND UNITIZATION

335

in which it exists? It has been the opinion of oil lawyers with whom the
writer has been associated that in the absence of actual production from
the tract in which such interest is owned it will expire by its own terms.
This result may be justified by a strict reading of the terms of the
leases, the unit contract, and the deed creating the interest but it would
seem to be preferable to protect these interests, especially if the owners
are to be "sold" on the merits of unitization. It is not reasonable to
suppose a man would willingly join in an arrangement when to do so
may foreclose a chance for a return upon an investment, by the circumstance, by accident or design, that no unit well will be drilled upon the
tract in which he has invested. Protection can be a:ff orded by a clause
in the contract perpetuating the term-royalties just as the leases are
perpetuated by the unit production. No case has been found involving
the matter herein discussed, but such a case probably will arise. An
arrangement protecting the term-royalty owner is to be preferred to
expensive litigation.
To this point the discussion of voluntary unitization has been concerned with the separate unitization contract. This has been, by far,
the most widely used. Mr. Glassmire, however, has suggested use in
the oil and gas lease of a clause similar in form to the pooling clause.96
The suggested clause would authorize the lessee to include the leased
premises in any plan of development of the field in which the premises
were located as a unit. In the event a unit was formed, the lease would
be perpetuated by production from any part of the unit, and the lessee
would be relieved of other obligations.respecting the leased land. This
clause is subject to the same objections and limitations as those observed
in the case of the pooling clause, therefore no extended discussion of
it will be attempted.

VII
COMPULSORY UNITIZATION

Most students of the problems. of field-wide unitization have urged
the industry to put its own house in order and to put the principle into
practice through voluntary action. But it is recognized that certain
elements, some of which have been discussed above, may render necessary some form of governmental compulsion before full realization of
the plan is achieved. Speaking before the.New Mexico State Bar Association in 1930, Mr. Veasey stated the case in these words:
"Everyone who has reflected upon the subject concedes that
96

GLASS\URE, 01L AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES,

2d ed., 402 (1938).
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these two necessary reforms [ unit development and cooperative
operation] should be brought about by the voluntary action of oil
operators. Every private American enterprise resents far-reaching
regulation by law and this applies with special emphasis when
the particular business is highly individualistic and technical, both
of these elements applying in this case. Nevertheless the Petroleum Industry is faced by this peculiar situation at the ~oment.
Probably producing companies owning 7 5 per cent of the nation's
production and 7 5 per cent of the undeveloped acreage in one
degree or another, are committed to the principle of unit development. With them it is more a matter of finding the machinery to
make the project workable than it is in disputing the principle
itself. The question then arising is just how long this majority
interest in the Petroleum Industry will permit a constructive and
far-reaching business policy to be interfered with by a perverse
minority.
" ... So where a majority, or some higher percentage of oil
operators in the pool, agree upon a plan for the development and
operation of that pool of a character that will insure the use of the
gas energy to its highest efficiency, and if the minority continue to
hold out and continue to indulge in wasteful and other improper
practices in respect of the gas energy, a police measure may be
enacted compelling all of the operators in the pool to adapt their
producing activities to the more efficient method. In a constitutional sense the only precaution that must be taken is that the
character of regulation imposed shall- be reasonable and that it
shaP operate equally upon all of the operators in the pool." 97
In 1931 Mr. W. P. Z. German, one of the early exponents of unit
development, after reviewing the drainage district cases, exemplified
_by Wurts v. Hoagland,98 made this suggestion:
"These reference,s to laws relating to drainage districts suggest
that the legislature of, a state might authorize the creation of oil
and gas conservation districts, with power in the owners of leases
upon lands within an oil field or area which may be thought to be
underlaid with oil or gas, to organize such a district to be operated
on a unit plan; all with a view to accomplishing two purposesfirst, the prevention of the waste of oil and/or gas in the area for
the general benefit of the public at large, and to conserve it for use
97
Veasey, "The Struggle of the American Petroleum Industry for Economic
Equality," PRoc. OF NEW Mp:xrco STATE BAR AssN. 98 at 123 (1930).
98
114 U.S. 606, 5 S.Ct. 1086 (1884).

337

POOLING AND UNITIZATION

as and when needed by the public, and, second, to bring about a
fair distribution of the content of the reservoir among the several
land proprietors and to protect each against the extraction by any
of a disproportionate part thereof." 99
'

The legislatures in the various oil states have been very reluctant
to follow the lead suggested by this writer. In some of these states
oil lands may be unitized by voluntary action under permissive statutes,100 however, these same statutes contain compulsory unitization
features relating to recycling of gas.101 The most complete statute relating to compulsory unitization, to date, is the Oklahoma act.102 Even
this act is not entirely compulsory for it specifies ·that lessees of record
of 50 -per cent or more of the area sought to be unitized must petition
for the proposed plan before the Corporation Commission can take
jurisdiction and at any time after filing the petition and within 60 days
after entry of an order approving the plan, lessees of record of I 5 per
cent or more of the area may protest whereupon the commission must
vacate any order made and dismiss the proceeding. It is to be observed,
however, that the prime source of difficulty in any plan of unitizationthe royalty interests-are not parties to the proceedings hence the provisions noted should not present too much difficulty in the workability
of the statute.
The act has not been subjected to a court test but such a. test is
certain to come. 103 Probably the same constitutional attacks will be made
on it as were leveled against the well-spacing law 104 and, it is submitted, the same principles supporting that law may be applied to this
one. A decision favorable to the act would be of great assistance to
the industry in its efforts to solve the difficulty of achieving successful
unitization of leases.
e9 German, "Compulsory Unit Operation of Oil Pools," 17 A. B. A.
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at 399 (1931).
100 The permission in Texas is limited to gas cycling units. Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1937) art. 6008, § 21.
101
For example, La. Acts (1940) No. 157, § 4(b}. ·
102
Okla. Laws (1945) p. 162 et seq., 52 Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1945) § 286.1

et seq.
108

Since this article was written an appeal has been taken to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court from the Corporation Commission's order in The Application for Creation
of West Cement Medrano Unit, Cause CD-1308. One of the issues raised is the
constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute,
104
Patterson v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P. (2d) 83
(1938), appeal dismissed 305 U.S. 376, 59 S.Ct. 259 (1939); Croxton v. State, 186
Okla. 249, 97 P. (2d) II (1939).
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VIII
EFFECT OF PooLING AND UNITIZATION ON IMPLIED CovENANTS

There is one other important problem.that should be noted, namely, the effect of cooperative projects, pooling for well spacing or fieldwide unitization, upon the implied covenants 105 of an oil and gas lease
that may be involved in such projects. The problem will not be so
acute in the case of voluntary efforts for, assuming participation of all
interests, the contract, if carefully drawn, will provide for the matter.
In the case of the compulsory statutes the lessee may be faced with a
serious problem. The question presented is whether the lessee is or is
not provided with a good defense in an action for breach of an implied
covenant by compliance with statutory or administrative regulations in
the development of an oil and gas lease. One of the foremost scholars
in the field of implied covenants has advanced the opinion that a lessee
confronted with a charge of failing to comply with an implied covenant
may not "set up an impregnable defense merely by pointing to an administrative regulation which, on its face, forbids compliance with the
obligation put forward." 106 In Sun Oil Company v. Potter the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals said,
"The lessees are invested with full control over the leased
premises, including the right of possession and to develop and the
incidental right to apply for the necessary drilling permits. These
rights import corresponding duties of the lessees for breach of
which they would be liable." 101
The case suggests a representative capacity in the lessee on behalf
of the lessor to secure the benefits of regulatory measures. It would
seem then that to escape liability for breach of an implied covenant
under the cloak of a regulation the lessee must ihow diligence, not only
in securing relief from administrative rules that may be improper, but
also in procuring proper formulation of those rules when originally
promulgated. Diligence may further require resort to courts, even to
the highest tribunal, before the relief from an implied covenant may be
accorded.108 The discussion of implied covenants and regulation was
10
~ The authoritative treatise in this field is MERRILL, CoVENANTS IMPLIED IN
OIL AND GAS LEASES, 2d ed. ( 1940).
106
Merrill, "Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and
Gas Leases," 23 TEX. L. REV. 137 at 141 (1945).
101
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944) 1~2 S.W. (2d) 923.
108
Merrill, "Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and
Gas Leases," 23 TEX. L. REV. 137 (1945).
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sharply drawn during the late war when federal regulation of the industry was in force. 1O0 Regulation of the type contained in the Oklahoma unitization statute, where the royalty owners must depend upon
the diligence of their lessees to secure the fullest advantages under the
law, will present a fertile field for tests of the principles discussed here.
In spite of the social advantages to be derived from unitization no
property owner should be subjected to unreasonable regulation. The
relationship existing between the lessor and lessee under an oil and gas
lease should, and does, place the burden on the lessee to test the reasonableness of the regulation.

IX
CONCLUSION

In view of the present state of learning respecting the physical
characteristics of oil and gas reservoirs the most desirable device for
drilling control is unit operation. The vast storehouses of nature in
which the substances are found do not, of course, conform to surface
property lines, therefore they are the natural units of development in
place of the geographical and legal subdivisions of the surface. Development of an oil and gas reservoir as a unit results in an astonishing
increase in the ultimate yield of the reservoir through the efficient use
of the natural reservoir energy. Aside from the increased ultimate
recovery, unit operation is also advantageous over other methods in
that it results in lowered development and operating costs; it helps to
make products more responsive to producers' needs; and it effects
savings in plant capacities, pipe line and storage facilities.
The lead in developing the idea of unit operation has been assumed
by the petroleum engineer and geologist. For many years these technologists have devoted a great deal of time and effort to devising ways
and means to eliminate waste in the production of oil and gas. They
have made exhaustive studies of the characteristics of the oil and gas
reservoirs, and they have developed new and more efficient techniques
of production. The engineer has been the foremost advocate of unit
development. But while technical knowledge has advanced rapidly
and new methods suggested, the law of oil and gas has not kept pace,
hence a man-made barrier to putting the new methods into effective
operation must be overcome. It is apparent that close cooperation be100 Ibid; see also Eberhardt, ''War on Implied Covenants," II KAN. B. A. J. 102
(1942); Hays and Hudson, "Effect of Conservation Order M-68 on Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases," IO GEo. WASH. L. REv. 926 (1943).
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tween the engineer and lawyer will be required for full realization of
the benefits of the advanced engineering techniques.110
Advocates of unitization have entertained the hope that it could
be accomplished by voluntary action on the part of those interested in
oil and gas pools. This would be an ideal solution to a problem, but
the human factor in the equation presents a real obstacle to its realization. Probably the greatest real need today is education of all persons
:in the oil producing states in the advantages and desirability of unitization,111 but it appears that we cannot hope for a complete solution
in this way. If unitization is to be adopted as the standard method of
development; a~d operation of oil and gas pools the joinder of all
1nterests therein may, and probably will, have to be compelled by
:Statute.
110

See Oliver, "Cooperation Between Lawyers and Engineers," 56 A. B. A.
iREP. 691 at 693 (1931); Nyce, "Cooperation Between Engineers and Lawyers," 17
A. B. A. J. 325 at 327 (1931).
111 See Moses, "Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Unit Operations of Oil
Fields," 21 TEX. L. REv. 748 at 752 (1943). ·
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